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Résumé / Abstract 
 
We show that confidence regions covering the identified set may be preferable to confidence 
regions covering each of its points in robust control applications. 
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When conducting inference on partially identi¯ed parameters, Imbens and Manski (2004) pointed
out that con¯dence regions may cover the whole identi¯ed set with a prescribed probability, to which
we shall refer as set coverage, or they may cover each of its points with a prescribed probability, to
which we shall refer as point coverage. Since set coverage implies point coverage, con¯dence regions
satisfying point coverage are generally preferred on the grounds that they may be more informative.
The object of this note is to describe a decision problem in which, contrary to received wisdom,
point coverage is clearly undesirable.
Consider a random vector s = (X;") on f1;:::;Ng. Call realizations si, i = 1;:::;N; of this
random vector states of the world, and call their collection S = fs1;:::;sNg. Suppose states of
the world are partially observable, by which we mean that the realizations fx1;:::;xNg of X can
be observed over repeated experiments, but not the realizations f"1;:::;"Ng of ". Call PX the
probability mass function of random vector X. Let £ be a set of models for the states, de¯ned by
the fact that for each µ 2 £, Pµ denotes a probability mass function for the random vector (X;").





µ 2 £ :
N X
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More generally, any additional a priori restriction on the joint distribution of (X;") can be incorpo-
rated in the de¯nition of the identi¯ed set.
Suppose a decision maker may choose among actions in a set A = fa1;:::;aKg. The actions
may be treatments, as in Manski (2004), or policy controls as in Brainard (1967). Actions in A
are de¯ned as functions from S to real valued outcomes. Call U(a;µ) the ex-ante utility of the
decision maker, when she knows Pµ to be the true data generating process for (X;"). Typically, this
will be von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility U(a;µ) =
R
a(s)dPµ(s). We shall consider two
robust decision making procedures based on the identi¯ed set: (i) maxmin, where the decision maker
maximizes the functional evaluation V (a) = min£I U(a;µ) over A and (ii) minmax regret, where
the decision maker maximizes V (a) = min£I[U(a;µ) ¡ maxa2A U(a;µ)] over A. The arguments we
make do not depend on which of the two options (i) or (ii) is chosen, so we shall concentrate on a
maxmin decision maker.
The decision maker is supposed to have access to two types of con¯dence regions for £I based
on repeated sampling in the state space. A region covering the identi¯ed set called £SC such that
P(£I 2 £SC) = 1 ¡ ® and a region covering each point of the identi¯ed set called £PC such that
minµ2£I P(µ 2 £PC) = 1¡®. Without necessarily subscribing to the learning model of Epstein andSET COVERAGE 3
Schneider (2007), we appeal to Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) and \assume that our decision
maker worries about alternative models that available data cannot readily dispose of". Hence, the
decision maker considers two decision rules based on the two respective con¯dence regions. The
decision rule based on £SC consists in choosing ^ aSC in A to maximize minµ2£SC U(a;µ) and the
decision rule based on £PC consists in choosing ^ aPC in A that maximizes minµ2£PC U(a;µ). The









¸ 1 ¡ ®;
so that minµ2£SC U(a;µ) provides a lower bound for the actual utility functional V (^ aSC) with
probability at least as large as 1¡®. The decision rule based on £PC, however, is not robust as will
be shown with the following example that we contrived in the simplest possible way for expositional
purposes.
Let f1;:::;Ng be a population of individuals and let X 2 fF;Mg be their gender and " 2 fT;NTg
be their talent (T for talented and NT for not so talented). Half the population is male and half the
population is talented, but the correlation µ between talent and gender is unknown. The decision
maker is a social planner who can o®er an education opportunity to women only (action a1), to men
only (action a2) or to everyone (action a3). The net bene¯t of o®ering the education opportunity to
a talented person is B. The net bene¯t of o®ering the education opportunity to a not so talented
person is ¡B (wasted resources). The net bene¯t of failing to o®er the education opportunity to a not
so talented person is zero. Finally, the net bene¯t of failing to o®er the education opportunity to a
talented person is ¡B (wasted talent). Assume that the parameter set is equal to £ = fµ1;µ2;µ3;µ4g,
where under µ1 all talent is male, and under µ2 all talent is female, under µ3 everyone is talented and
under µ4 no one is talented. Given the a priori constraints on the joint distribution of gender and
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Note that P(µ1 = 2 £SC or µ2 = 2 £SC) = ®, whereas for £PC we only require that either P(µ1 = 2
£PC) · ® and P(µ2 = 2 £PC) = ®, or P(µ1 = 2 £PC) = ® and P(µ2 = 2 £PC) · ®. If £PC is more
informative than £SC, then 2® ¸ P(µ1 = 2 £PC or µ2 = 2 £PC) > ®. Take the case µ1 = 2 £PC and
suppose for clarity that £PC = fµ2g, then minµ2£PC U(a;µ) = B=2 if a = a1, ¡B if a = a2 and
0 if a = a3; and symmetrically if µ2 = 2 £PC. Hence, when µj = 2 £PC, the action that maximizes
minµ2£PC U(a;µ) is ^ aPC = aj and minµ2£I U(^ aPC;µ) = minµ2£I U(aj;µ) = ¡B which can be
much smaller than min£PC U(aj;µ) = B=2. Hence the action taken on the basis of the region with
point coverage yields a utility that may be much smaller than it appears with a probability strictly
larger than ®. In contrast ^ aSC = a3 with probability at least 1 ¡ ® so min£SC U(^ aSC;µ) = 0 and
min£I U(^ aSC;µ) = 0 with probability at least 1 ¡ ®, so that decision based on the region providing
set coverage does not su®er from the same lack of robustness.
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